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THE VIABILITY OF STAYS OF FEDERAL ACTIONS PENDING
THE OUTCOME OF PARALLEL STATE LITIGATION
Whether a federal court can stay an in personam' civil 2 action pending
the outcome of state court litigation involving the same or substantially the
same parties and issues remains an unsettled question.' When a decisive
issue of state law is involved, or the possibility of avoiding a constitutional
question exists, the federal court will generally defer to the state court
through invocation of the abstention doctrine.4 Under most other circum-
stances, the general rule, at first glance, would seem to be that a stay is
within the discretion of the district court. Upon more intensive analysis,
however, and in light of a 1976 United States Supreme Court decision,
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,' there ap-
pears to be no uniform solution among the circuits.
In August, 1977, the case of Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will
6
changed the law in the Seventh Circuit on this issue. Calvert held that a
federal district court could stay an action before it only if certain exceptional
circumstances exist.7 In so holding, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit overruled its earlier decision in Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer.8
Aetna had left it to the discretion of a district court to stay an action before it
pending the outcome of parallel state litigation.
The problem with the Calvert decision is that it implicitly equates a
stay with a dismissal. 9 While there are some cases in which a stay can have
the practical effect of a dismissal,' 0 the terms "stay" and "dismissal" are
i. As to in rem actions, the traditional rule has been that the court which first acquires
control of the res will adjudicate the action. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235
(1922).
2. The scope of this article will be limited to civil actions.
3. This issue is not a new question. See generally Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in
Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 684 (1960) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Stays of Federal Proceedings]; Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending
Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J. 978 (1950).
4. The scope of this article is limited to the power of a federal court to stay proceedings
when the abstention doctrine is not applicable. For an exhaustive treatment of the abstention
doctrine, see Pell, Abstention, A Primrose Path by Any Other Name, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 926
(1972). See also 20 AM. JUR. 2d, Courts § 14 (1965); 32 AM. JUR. 2d, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 13 (1967).
5. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
6. 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978) (No.
77-693).
7. Id. at 796. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
8. 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
9. The court found that the distinction between a stay and a dismissal was "not im-
portant." 560 F.2d at 796.
10. If another court renders a judgment that has a res judicata effect, the action may be
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technically different. Although most federal courts adhere to the proper use
of these terms, some courts are not so precise."I This imprecise use aggra-
vates the confusion among the circuits as to what to do when there is
concurrent jurisdiction over an action in state and federal courts.
After briefly considering the differences between a stay and a dismiss-
al, this note will examine the United States Supreme Court opinions on
which the lower federal courts rely when faced with this issue. It will then
discuss the views espoused by the circuits and conclude with an analysis of
the use of the stay by considering Colorado River and the factors that the
courts should apply when confronted with this problem.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DISMISSAL AND STAY
A dismissal is "an order for the termination of a case without a trial of
any of its issues." 12 When a court dismisses an action, it abandons its
jurisdiction over that action. If it is a dismissal without prejudice with leave
to reinstate, the complaint can, under some circumstances, be reinstated
upon a motion by one of the parties. 13 When the dismissal is withrprejudice,
the action cannot be brought again.' 4
In contrast to a dismissal, a stay is merely a temporary cessation of the
proceedings.15 When an action has been stayed, the court retains jurisdiction
over it and can resume the proceedings at any time. When the proceedings
are reactivated, res judicata16 or collateral estoppel 7 can apply if another
court has rendered a final judgment or has decided a particular issue. A stay
can be granted: (1) when there is another action pending (it is not always
moot when the stay is vacated. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 682
(5th Cir. 1973).
11. This is especially true in the use of the terms stay and abatement, which at common
law was a dismissal, but in equity was a suspension of the action. In equity, an abated action
could be revived. First Nat'l Bank v. Board of Superiors, 221 Iowa 348, 264 N.W. 281 (1935);
F.A. Mfg. Co. v. Hayden & Clemons, Inc., 273 F. 374 (Ist Cir. 1921). See also Baer v.
Fahnestock & Co., 565 F.2d 261,.263 (3d Cir. 1977); 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abatement, Survival and
Revival §§ 3, 5 (1962).
12. 24 AM. JUR. 2d Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit § 1 (1966). See also Bracken-
ridge v. State, 27 Tex. Civ. Cas. 513, 11 S.W. 630 (1889); 27 C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit § I
(1959).
13. See Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., 539 F.2d 1191, 1194 (8th Cir. 1976); see also
Northrup v. Jay, 262 Mich. 463, 247 N.W. 717 (1933).
14. See Pulley v. Chicago R.I.&P. Ry., 122 Kan. 269, 251 P. 1100 (1927).
15. Solarana v. Industrial Elec., Inc., 50 Haw. 22, 428 P.2d 411 (1967).
16. Res judicata "gives conclusive finality to a final, valid judgment; and, if the judgment
is on the merits, precludes further litigation of the same cause of action between the same
parties or those in such legal relationship to them that they are said to be in privity and bound by
the judgment." lB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.401 at II (2d ed. 1974). See also Lawlor v.
National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
17. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit
"precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of
whether it was based on the same cause of action as the second suit." Lawlor v. National
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necessary that the other action involve the same parties and issues); (2)
while awaiting the payment of costs in a prior action; (3) to preserve the
status quo; (4) during a period of war when the plaintiff is an enemy and is
deprived of his standing to sue; or (5) when one party is in the military.
18
While both a dismissal and a stay have the effect of halting the
proceedings, a stay is the less drastic device. Hence, many courts have held
that it is preferable to stay an action19 and retain jurisdiction, rather than to
dismiss it and relinquish jurisdiction. With these basic differences in mind,
one can more easily scrutinize the cases that favor or disapprove of stays.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
Early United States Supreme Court cases, through dicta, set forth the
theory that a federal court could not refuse to exercise its properly invoked
jurisdiction.20 Based on this authority, the Court, in 1910, in McClellan v.
Carland,21 held that it would be error for a federal court to stay an action in
order to allow the state court to commence proceedings which might pre-
clude further action in the federal court.22 In language which has since been
frequently quoted, the Court stated that the pendency of a state court suit is
no bar to an action in federal court.23
McClellan and the later case of Kline v. Burke Construction Co. 24 are
often relied on today by those courts that refuse to grant stays based on the
pendency of parallel state litigation. Yet, both cases are distinguishable on
their facts. In McClellan, the record indicated that the stay had been granted
to allow the state to institute an action in state court. Affidavits were filed in
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). See generally 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.401-48 at 11-4201 (2d ed. 1974).
18. 1 AM. JUR. 2d Actions § 93 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., 521 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1975); Solarana v. Industrial Elec., Inc., 50 Haw. 22, 428 P.2d
411 (1967).
20. "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821). The courts of the United States "cannot
abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction." Chicot County v.
Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893).
21. 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
22. Id. at 281-82. If the state court proceedings resulted in a final judgment, the doctrine
of res judicata might be invoked to bar a second suit on the same cause of action. See note 16
supra.
23. Specifically, the Court in McClellan stated:
The rule is well recognized that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction, for
both the state and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such controver-
sies, and when they arise between citizens of different states the Federal jurisdiction
may be invoked, and the cause carried to judgment, notwithstanding a state court may
have also taken jurisdiction of the same case.
Id. at 282.
24. 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
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the Supreme Court, however, which indicated that the state court had
actually commenced proceedings before the federal action and had ruled
adversely to the plaintiffs in the federal suit. Thus, the lower federal court
judge felt a stay was warranted in order to allow the state court to culminate
its litigation. The Supreme Court stated that because the affidavits were not
part of the record, it would not consider them and decided the case based on
the facts as presented in the record, i.e., that the federal action was stayed to
allow the state to bring an action, rather than to culminate one that had
already been brought. 25 Hence, it is questionable how the Court would have
ruled had it been able to consider the fact that prior state court action was
involved. McClellan, therefore, can only stand for the proposition that a
stay cannot be granted prior to the commencement of a state court suit.
26
Kline v. Burke Construction Co. 27 was a contract dispute in which the
construction company asked the federal court to enjoin the state court
proceedings. In holding that a federal court could not enjoin an in personam
state court proceeding, the Court declared that "each court [state and
federal] is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without
reference to the proceedings in the other court." 28 Since the issue in Kline
was whether a federal court could enjoin the state court proceedings, that
case, like McClellan, does not answer the question as to whether a federal
court can stay its own proceedings in deference to a previously commenced
state court suit.
Landis v. North American Co. 29 is the strongest authority for propo-
nents of a discretionary stay. The action in Landis arose out of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 193530 under which the North American
Company would have to register with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. North American and American Water Works and Electric Com-
pany brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia
challenging the constitutionality of the Act and asking the court to enjoin its
enforcement. On the same day, the Securities and Exchange Commission
instituted a test suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, seeking an order compelling various public utilities companies to
register with them.
Despite North American's contention that the questions presented in
the two suits were not identical and that the outcome of the New York suit
25. 217 U.S. at 282-83.
26. See Stays of Federal Proceedings, supra note 3, at 688.
27. 263 U.S. 226 (1922).
28. Id. at 230.
29. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
30. Public Utility Act, ch. 681, tit. I, § 33, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 79 (1976)).
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would not necessarily be determinative of their rights, 3' the District Court
for the District of Columbia stayed its proceedings. The stay was to extend
until the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in the other suit.
Further, the stay was conditioned upon "diligent and active prosecution of
the Government's suit." 32 The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 33
The Supreme Court held that the stay as granted by the district court
was improper in that it awaited the final decision of the other litigation by
the Supreme Court. 34 However, the Court made it quite clear that "the
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." 35 Emphasis was given to
the "counsels of moderation" 36 that must be considered when a stay is
granted. There must be a balancing of the competing interests. The party
seeking the stay must show a clear case of hardship or inequity in being
required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay will
adversely affect one of the parties. 37 Further, when granted the stay should
not extend beyond the time of the decision of the court in which the other
action is pending.
38
While Landis offers precise guidelines for the courts to follow in
granting stays, both suits involved in that case were in federal courts. The
problem of a federal court deferring to a state court was not present. Hence,
Landis is merely persuasive authority for a federal court to consider when
deciding the propriety of granting a stay in deference to a parallel state
action.
In 1942, in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America,39 the Court,
without even considering the possibility of a stay, held that a federal court
could dismiss a declaratory judgment action pending the outcome of state
court litigation. Brillhart's decedent was killed by a truck that was insured
by Central Insurance Company. Central was, in turn, insured by Excess. In
trying to recover a default judgment awarded by the state court, Brillhart
instituted garnishment proceedings against Central in state court. Excess
31. 299 U.S. at 251.
32. Id. at 253.
33. Id. at 254.
34. Id. at 256. The Court pointed out that the other litigation was still pending in the trial
court.
35. Id. at 254.
36. Id. at 255.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 256-57. The Court said that this would not preclude the petitioners from
requesting a second stay after the first stay expired. However, the burden of proving the
necessity of a second stay would again be on the petitioners.
39. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
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sought a declaratory judgment in federal court, contending that it was not
liable on the grounds that Central had not notified it of the default judgment.
Brillhart subsequently made Excess a respondent in the garnishment suit.
While the district court dismissed, the court of appeals reversed and remand-
ed, holding that dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The United States
Supreme Court held that a dismissal would be proper when the state court
could satisfactorily adjudicate the claims of all the parties.' Since the
holding in Brillhart has been confined to declaratory judgment actions, 4 it
is persuasive but not controlling authority in other instances.
In the 1976 case of Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States ,42 the Court considered whether it was proper to dismiss a
federal suit involving a dispute over water rights when there was concurrent
jurisdiction with a state court. Reiterating the fundamental notion that a
federal court must not refuse to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction,
4 3
the Court acknowledged certain exceptional circumstances which would
justify a dismissal of the federal action, in the interest of wise judicial
administration. While no single factor is determinative, the Court found that
the existence of exceptional circumstances might be indicated by: (1) the
assumption of jurisdiction over a res by the state court; (2) the inconven-
ience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litiga-
tion; and (4) the order in which the state and federal courts obtained
concurrent jurisdiction.4
In Colorado River, the Court found that a dismissal would further the
policy of the McCarran Amendment45 which allows joinder of the United
States as a defendant in suits involving water rights. After studying the
legislative history of the Amendment, 46 the Court decided that "[t]he clear
federal policy evinced by that legislation is the avoidance of piecemeal
adjudication of water rights in a river system," 47 and that this could best be
accomplished by dismissing the federal suit.
Although the Supreme Court in Colorado River was concerned with
the dismissal of a federal action, and repeatedly used the word dismissal,48
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, when addressing the issue of
the propriety of a stay in Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 49 relied on
40. Id. at 495.
41. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1973).
42. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
43. Id. at 817.
44. Id. at 818.
45. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
46. 424 U.S. at 807-09.
47. Id. at 819.
48. Id. at 813, 818-21.
49. 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978) (No.
77-693).
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Colorado River and applied the exceptional circumstances test. In doing so,
the court abandoned its earlier rule that a stay was within the discretion of
the district court. 50 However, because some of the lower federal courts
adhere to the distinctions between a dismissal and a stay and are anxious to
avoid duplicative litigation, there is a strong possibility that those courts will
not find Colorado River to be controlling in regard to the issues of granting
a stay pending the outcome of a parallel state action.
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
Courts in Favor of Stays
The Second Circuit quite clearly approves of stays pending the out-
come of parallel state litigation. 51 In the leading case of Mottolese v.
Kaufman,52 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit borrowed from the
doctrine of forum non conveniens,53 and held that a defendant in a share-
holders' derivative suit should not be subjected to oppressive multiple
litigation on the same cause of action. While Mottolese involved a share-
holders' derivative action where the likelihood of multiple litigation on the
same cause of action is greater than in most situations, the Second Circuit
has not confined the Mottolese rule to shareholders' derivative actions.
Rather, the court of appeals and at least one of the district courts have
focused on the overall desirability of avoiding what they feel is unnecessary
duplicative litigation.
For example, in Ungar v. Mandell,54 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit overturned the dismissal of a diversity suit brought by
Ungar. In doing so, it declared that the suit appeared to be "a glaring
example of the waste, duplication and vexatiousness that can be perpetrated
through utilization of diversity jurisdiction." 55 Ungar filed the action after
Mandell had instituted a state court suit alleging libel and slander. Ungar's
federal court complaint asserted that Mandell had violated an agreement
between them to settle their state court suits and sought specific perform-
ance, or in the alternative, damages, and an injunction of the state court
litigation. The Second Circuit held that the district court's dismissal was
50. Id. at 796.
51. See, e.g., Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
53. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens a court may dismiss an action if there
exists another more appropriate forum in which to bring the action. Important considerations in
the application of the doctrine are: (I) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
availability of witnesses; (3) the possibility of viewing the premises, when appropriate; (4) the
interest in avoiding crowded dockets in certain forums; and, (5) the local interest in resolving
localized controversies at home. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
54. 471 F.2d 1163 (2d Cir. 1972).
55. Id. at 1165.
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inappropriate because the case presented none of the narrow circumstances
56
under which a federal court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The
court of appeals went on to infer that a stay would have been the proper
course to follow in such a situation. Thus, the Second Circuit recognized the
distinction between a dismissal and a stay.
57
Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has
granted stays when: (1) the state and federal suits were brought by the same
plaintiff who appeared to be forum-shopping;58 (2) the state and federal
actions turned exclusively on issues of state law which a state court could
more easily decide; 59 (3) the state court could give more complete relief;
60
and, (4) the state court proceeding had progressed further than the federal
action.
61
Because the Second Circuit has found that the distinction between a
dismissal and a stay is an important one, and because it has recognized the
use of a stay as a means of avoiding unnecessary multiple litigation, it may
not find Colorado River62 to be controlling. Thus, it is likely to continue to
follow the rule that stays are discretionary.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit permits a stay in equity suits
only. The case of PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co. 63 was an
action seeking a declaratory judgment of the parties' rights under a gas sale
contract and an injunction restraining the defendant from breaching the
contract. The Fifth Circuit, concluding that the underlying cause of action
was equitable, 64 affirmed the district court's stay pending the final determi-
nation of the Texas state court action involving the same parties and
issues. 65 The court of appeals noted that although a stay might have the
practical effect of a dismissal, a stay was preferable because the district
court might want to reactivate the proceedings should there be a delay in the
state court action. 66 The court also stated its belief that the United States
56. The "narrow circumstances" in Ungar are not to be confused with the "exceptional
circumstances" test of Colorado River. The Ungar court was referring to those circumstances
justifying abstention. Id. at 1166. See also text accompanying note 4 supra. See text accom-
panying note 44 supra for the exceptional circumstances test of Colorado River.
57. 471 F.2d at 1166. Because the state action had been concluded by the time of the
federal appeal, a stay was no longer viable.
58. Mars, Inc. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
59. Universal Gypsum of Ga., Inc. v. American Cyanamid, Co., 390 F. Supp. 824
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
60. Witmar Salvage Corp. v. C. W. Blakeslee and Sons, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 395, 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
61. Mitter v. Massa, 237 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
62. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
63. 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973).
64. Id. at 679.
65. Id. at 684.
66. Id. at 682.
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Supreme Court has shown a policy against dual litigation which applies
equally to declaratory judgment actions and to ordinary equity suits, but not
necessarily to actions at law.67 Thus, the court would not go so far as to hold
that a stay is discretionary in suits seeking to enforce legal remedies. In
equitable actions, though, the Fifth Circuit felt that a stay is proper when the
same parties and issues are involved in the state and federal actions, the state
court is an adequate forum in which to litigate the claims, and the federal
court serves no purpose other than mere duplication of effort. Other factors
that the court felt should be considered in determining the propriety of a stay
include the advantage of joinder, the priority of filing, the prospects of early
completion of the state court suit, and fairness to the parties.
68
Because the Fifth Circuit in PPG Industries recognized the distinction
between a stay and a dismissal, it is possible that it would consider Colorado
River to apply only to dismissals and not to stays. However, even if the
Fifth Circuit were to find that Colorado River applies equally to dismissals
and stays, the court might adhere to its view that stays in deference to
parallel state proceedings are proper only in equity actions. The court's
opinion in PPG Industries stressed the close relationship between suits for
declaratory relief and those seeking injunctions or other equitable relief.
69
Because the action in Colorado River sought a declaration of the parties'
rights to the use of federal water,70 the Fifth Circuit might find that this was
merely laying the ground for an injunction; hence, the underlying cause
would be equitable.
The Ninth Circuit favored stays in Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co. 71 and McGreghar Land Co. v. Meguiar.72 In Weiner, the plaintiff had
filed suit in state court in Arizona, alleging that the defendant had mishan-
dled the sale and purchase of plaintiff's stock. The plaintiff subsequently
transformed the action into one based on violations of the federal securities
laws and filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Arizona.
The district court dismissed the action, but did not state on what grounds it
based the dismissal. 73 The court of appeals reversed, holding that even if
"abatement" 74 was proper, a stay was preferable.75 On remand, the district
court would have to determine whether under the facts of the case, the state
court would be able to adjudicate all of the issues. The court of appeals
indicated that because Weiner had raised the violations of the federal
67. Id. at 679.
68. Id. at 683.
69. Id. at 680.
70. 424 U.S. at 805.
71. 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975).
72. 521 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1975). But see note 78 and accompanying text infra.
73. 521 F.2d at 818.
74. See note I I and accompanying text supra.
75. 521 F.2d at 821.
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securities laws in his answer to Shearson, Hammill's state court counter-
claim, the state court might be able to adjudicate that issue.76 If the state court
was unable to determine whether there were violations of the federal securi-
ties laws, the federal court could always resume the proceedings, having
retained jurisdiction by means of the stay.
McGreghar, the other Ninth Circuit case, was an action alleging fraud
in the inducement to invest in a limited partnership. The defendants moved
to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party or, in the alternative, to
abate pending the outcome of state court action to dissolve the partnership.
In holding that the district court was in error when it dismissed the action,
the court of appeals stated that the court should have stayed the proceedings,
thus retaining jurisdiction over the cause. 77 As seen from Weiner and
McGreghar, the Ninth Circuit today adheres to the precise use of the terms,
"dismissal" and "stay." 7 8 Hence, it probably will not consider Colorado
River to be controlling when deciding the propriety of stays.
A summary of the factors which should be considered before granting a
stay was given by a district court in the Third Circuit in Nigro v. Blum-
berg .79 The court there held that the following criteria should be considered:
(1) the interest of comity;80 (2) the promotion of judicial efficiency; (3) the
adequacy and extent of relief available in the alternative forum; (4) the
identity of parties and issues in both actions; (5) the likelihood of prompt
disposition in the alternative forum; (6) the convenience of parties, counsel
and witnesses; and (7) the possibility of prejudice to a party as a result of a
stay. 8' In staying the federal action, the Nigro court was careful to stress
that it was not relinquishing its jurisdiction and that the stay order could be
modified if the plaintiff was to allege material facts and circumstances that
would justify it. 82 Hence, the Nigro court, like the courts in the Second,
Fourth, 83 Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, recognized the basic distinction between
a stay and a dismissal, that of reserving jurisdiction as opposed to relin-
quishing it, and followed the more moderate approach of staying the action.
Courts That Have Denied Stays
The courts that have denied stays have generally done so because
jurisdiction over one or more of the issues has been exclusively federal. In
76. Id. at 821-22.
77. Id. at 822.
78. But see Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1963) (Duniway,
J., dissenting) where the court apparently confused a stay with a dismissal.
79. 373 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
80. Comity refers to easy intercourse among sovereigns. It is used in the context of
avoiding unnecessary friction with the state court. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.
226, 229 (1922).
81. 373 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
82. Id. at 1214.
83. See Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967).
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Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Association ,84 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the district court should not have stayed an action
in which the plaintiff alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
193485 and of rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 86 The
reasoning behind this decision was that the parties in both the state and
federal actions were not identical, one of the causes of action in the federal
court was not present in the state court litigation, and the state court lacked
jurisdiction over the claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.87
Similar reliance on preemption was employed by the Ninth Circuit in
issuing a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate a stay order
in Lecor, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central District of
California .88 In 1972, Lecor had purchased two million shares of stock in
the Luminall Corporation. In April, 1973, one Samson, the former president
of Luminall, brought an action in state court alleging breach of employment
and consulting contracts. The amended complaint sought damages and
specific performance. Two months later, Lecor and Luminall filed suit in
federal court, against Samson and an auditing firm, asserting misrepresenta-
tion and violations of the federal securities laws. The district court condi-
tioned the stay on an agreement by Samson that he would not oppose the
addition of parties or consolidation of claims in the state court, and that he
would diligently prosecute his claim.
89
The court of appeals distinguished Lecor from an earlier Ninth Circuit
case90 and focused on the fact that the federal court had exclusive juris-
diction over the claims alleging violation of the federal securities laws.
Also, the Ninth Circuit noted that Lecor had two parties who were not
named in the state court proceedings. Another factor that the court of
appeals felt was significant was the availability of a jury trial in the federal
suit. 91
When the question of the discretionary use of stays was addressed by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Calvert Fire Insurance Co.
v. Will,92 the court found that Colorado River93 was controlling and applied
84. 526 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1975).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976). This case was dealing specifically with an alleged violation of 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1976); see 526 F.2d at 540.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
87. 526 F.2d at 540.
88. 502 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1974). Compare id. with Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
89. Id. at 105.
90. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964).
91. 502 F.2d at 106.
92. 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978) (No.
77-693).
93. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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the exceptional circumstances test. 94 The dispute in Calvert arose out of a
contract under which the plaintiff joined a reinsurance pool operated by
American Mutual Reinsurance Co. Concluding that it had been fraudulent-
ly induced to participate in the pool, Calvert notified American Mutual of its
intention to rescind the contract. Subsequent litigation between the parties
ensued in both state and federal courts. American Mutual filed a declaratory
judgment action in state court, with Calvert counterclaiming, asserting
violations of federal securities laws, and seeking damages. On the same day
that it filed the state court answer, Calvert filed a complaint against Ameri-
can Mutual in federal court, raising all but one of the issues that it had set
forth in its state court counterclaim. Upon motion by American Mutual to
"abate," 9 5 or in the alternative, to dismiss the federal action, Judge Will
stayed all of Calvert's claims except that which was not before the state
court. 96 In granting the stay, Judge Will relied on Aetna State Bank v.
Altheimer97 which had a similar fact pattern. Calvert then filed a petition for
a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit asking
for a reversal of the stay order and also seeking a directive to Judge Will to
rule immediately on the one claim that he had not stayed.
98
In issuing the writ, the Seventh Circuit noted that Judge Will had
properly relied on Aetna. 99 Yet, the court, relying on Colorado River,
found that there were no exceptional circumstances in the Calvert case
which would justify a stay. 00 The Seventh Circuit felt that the effect of a
stay in Calvert was equivalent to a dismissal; 1° 1 thus the court applied
Colorado River, and, at the same time, overruled Aetna. 02 Although the
court in Calvert focused on the exceptional circumstances test, the court did
point out the strong federal policy and interest in regulating securities.
Because the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the rule lOb-5
claim, the court of appeals did not want to see the district court give up that
jurisdiction. 103
In a separate statement, Judge Pell,"°4 joined by three judges, declared
that the decision in Calvert to overrule Aetna had apparently taken the
94. 560 F.2d at 796. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
95. American Mutual may have wanted a stay. See note II supra.
96. 560 F.2d at 794-95.
97. 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
98. 560 F.2d at 794.
99. Id. at 795.
100. Id. at 796.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 795-96.
104. The judges in regular active service on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
voted on the issue of holding an en banc rehearing before overruling Aetna. Four of the eight
judges voted to hold the rehearing. Since this was not a majority, the rehearing en banc was not
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power to stay proceedings from the district court.'°5 Judge Pell indicated
that he did not believe the Supreme Court intended Colorado River to apply
to stays, because the language in Colorado River so clearly and frequently
referred to -dismissals. 106
Summary of the Approaches Taken by the Federal Courts
The federal courts have solved the problem of stays in deference to
state court proceedings on a case-by-case basis. Until Calvert, those courts
that denied stays generally did so because of the exclusive nature of their
jurisdiction over some of the claims involved. 10 7 Although the Seventh
Circuit in Calvert found this to be an important factor, its decision placed
principal reliance on the exceptional circumstances test of Colorado
River. 1
08
Those courts that have granted stays have considered several factors. 109
One such factor is the ability of the state court to successfully adjudicate the
claims of all the parties," which includes the question of whether the
federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over any of the claims. Hence, the
approach taken by those courts denying stays is actually in line with that
course followed by the courts granting stays.
While the Fifth Circuit has developed the rule that stays are discretion-
ary only in suits in equity,' 1 ' the Second, Ninth and Fourth Circuits consider
a stay of any action to be within the discretion of the district court.' 12 Until
Calvert, the Seventh Circuit shared this view. Since Calvert, the rule in the
Seventh Circuit is that the court must justify a stay by showing exceptional
circumstances. 
11 3
THE VALIDITY OF STAYS TODAY
While it has been argued that the exceptional circumstances test enun-
ciated in Colorado River applies not only to dismissals but also to stays,
1 4
this position is questionable. The Supreme Court in Colorado River was
held. Judge Pell then filed a separate statement in which he disagreed with the panel's overrul-
ing of Aetna. Judges Bauer, Fairchild, and Tone joined in the statement. 560 F.2d at 796 n.5.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See text accompanying notes 84-91 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 92-106 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 51-83 supra.
110. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 51-62, 71-83 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 92-106 supra.
114. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court
Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Stays and Dismissals].
NOTES AND COMMENTS
addressing the issue of the propriety of a dismissal;II5 the opinion specifical-
ly and repeatedly used the term, "dismissal. ""16 Given such terminology, it
is doubtful that the Court intended the decision to be equally applicable to
stays. 17 Moreover, the suggestion by one commentator that the Court
implicitly disapproves of the abrogation of federal jurisdiction by means of
stays 1 8 ignores the fact that the Court in Colorado River strained to find
justification for the dismissal. For example, the Court placed great reliance
on the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation." 9 Justice Stewart,
however, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens in dissent, 120
pointed out the fact that a dismissal in that case would not necessarily avoid
piecemeal litigation since the state court would have to conduct separate
proceedings to determine the federal claims. The state court's finding would
then have to be incorporated into one all-inclusive water source tabulation.
If the federal court were to determine the federal water claims, its decree
could easily be incorporated into the water source tabulation., 2' Thus, it
either made no difference as to which court decided the federal water
claims, or, possibly, resolution of the controversy was delayed because the
state court had the added burden of deciding the federal claims.
Justice Stewart also stated that there Were issues of federal law in-
volved in Colorado River which weighed heavily in favor of the retention of
jurisdiction by the federal court.1 22 Further, there were claims relating to
water set aside for Indian reservations; by dismissing the action, the federal
court would leave these claims to the state court. This procedure was
contrary to the federal policy to resolve important disputes involving Indians
in the federal forum. 23 Finally, Justice Stewart noted that the majority
opinion placed undue significance on the distance between the federal court
and the state court in justifying a dismissal of the federal action. 124 As
Justice Stewart indicated, the Court's reliance on this factor was misplaced
because the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado is authorized
to sit at Durango, the headquarters of the water division involved in the suit
and the locale of the state court.
1 25
115. 424 U.S. at 809.
116. Id. at 813, 818-21.
117. Judge Pell maintained this position in Calvert. 560 F.2d at 796 n.5. See note 104 supra.
See also Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., No. 77-693 (U.S., cert.
granted, Jan. 9, 1978).
118. See Federal Stays and Dismissals, supra note 114, at 679-80.
119. 424 U.S. at 818-19.
120. Id. at 821 (Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
121. Id. at 825.
122. Id. at 825-26.
123. Id. at 826.
124. Id. at 823-24 n.6. See also Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, id. at 827.
125. Id. at 823-24 n.6.
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Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, 126 felt that even if a weighing
of the relevant factors was justified, the Supreme Court should have de-
ferred to the judgment of the court of appeals which had ruled against a
dismissal. Justice Stevens thought that the court of appeals was in a better
position to evaluate the factors involved.
27
As shown by both dissenting opinions, the majority in Colorado River
seemed to be looking for a way to justify the dismissal. This hardly seems to
be an indication that the Court disapproves of the use of stays, which are less
drastic than dismissals, in order to promote wise judicial administration.'
1 28
If the Supreme Court does disapprove of the "abrogation of federal
jurisdiction" by the use of stays, and did intend the exceptional circum-
stances test of Colorado River to control stays as well as dismissals, then
evidently the Court has equated a stay with a dismissal. If this is true, the
Court has overlooked one very important distinction between the two de-
vices. When an action is dismissed with prejudice, it can be reinstated
subject to the statute of limitations for that cause of action. If the statute has
run, the motion to reinstate will be denied unless the opposing party fails to
raise the statute as a defense. An action that has been stayed, however, tolls
the running of the statute of limitations; thus, the proceedings can be
recommenced at any time. 129 Perhaps the Supreme Court in Colorado River
should have held that the lower federal courts should not dismiss the action
even under certain exceptional circumstances but should stay it. 130 By using
the stay, the court would not necessarily be abandoning its jurisdiction, and
the statute of limitations would not pose a problem.
Finally, because the court does retain jurisdiction over the action when
a stay is granted, it is a valuable tool for the courts to employ when faced
with an action that is also pending in the state court. While a party is entitled
to his day in court, there seems to be little justification for giving him two
courts, particularly when the dockets are so overcrowded.
When it is obvious to the court that the federal action has been
instituted in a vexatious or harassing spirit, or in an attempt to obtain a
judgment that would be res judicata in the other suit, a stay offers a way in
which the federal judiciary can avoid such abuse. (A dismissal would be
improper because the federal court would be abandoning its properly in-
126. Id. at 826.
127. Id. at 827.
128. See Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., No. 77-693 (U.S. cert.
granted, Jan. 9, 1978).
129. See Carr v. Grace, 516 F.2d 502, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Moore v. St. Louis
Music Supply Co., 539 F.2d 1191, 1194 (8th Cir. 1976).
130. But see Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., No. 77-693 (U.S.
cert. granted, Jan. 9, 1978).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
voked jurisdiction). Conversely, if it appears that the state suit was filed in
an attempt to circumvent the raising of meritorious claims which are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court, then a stay of the federal
action would be inappropriate. The denial of a stay based on the exclusivity
of the federal court's jurisdiction carries out the congressional policy behind
the grants of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Those courts that have denied
stays have, in fact, generally relied on the exclusive nature of their juris-
diction.
Other factors that the courts should, and usually do, 13 1 consider in-
clude: (1) the identity of the parties and issues in both actions; (2) the ability
of the other court to fully and satisfactorily adjudicate all the claims; (3) the
posture of the litigation in the other action; (4) the nature of the action and
the relief sought; (5) the possible prejudice to the parties; (6) the conven-
ience of the parties, counsel and witnesses; (7) the desire to avoid piecemeal
litigation; and (8) the interest of comity.' 32 A court granting a stay could do
so on the condition that the moving party will compromise to help overcome
a substantial objection to the stay.
Since a stay is a temporary suspension of the proceedings, the court
should not grant the stay to extend beyond the outcome of the parallel
action. If a delay arises in the other suit, the federal court should vacate its
stay, unless it is clear that the delay would also involve the federal action.
CONCLUSION
The question of a federal court staying an action pending the outcome
of a parallel state court suit has troubled the federal judiciary for many
years. As the United States Supreme Court has not yet made a definitive
determination, the power of a lower federal court to stay proceedings can
only be determined by the circuits as they interpret the related Supreme
Court decisions. Because some courts equate a stay with a dismissal, there is
confusion among the circuits as to whether a stay is within the discretion of
the district court, or can be granted only in certain instances. The Seventh
Circuit has held that the exceptional circumstances test of Colorado River,
which dealt with a dismissal, applies equally to stays and dismissals. If the
other circuits rely on Colorado River for guidance, the semantic confusion
will probably continue.
This article has suggested that the Supreme Court did not intend
Colorado River to control stays and that the stay is an effective means by
131. Siee, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973);
Universal Gypsum v. American Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Nigro v.
Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
132. See text within note 80 supra.
630 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
which a federal court can avoid duplicative litigation, while retaining its
jurisdiction. Fortunately, the Supreme Court is expected to decide this
precise issue in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. 1
33
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